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Education is reasonably expected to enhance intergenerational social mobility. However, the 
extent to which educational systems foster or otherwise constrain social mobility remains 
controversial. In this paper, data from the European Social Survey covering 22 countries is 
analysed in order to assess social mobility in the second half of the 20
th
 Century. Variation 
across five cohesive regional clusters is examined in detail. Results confirm increasing rates 
of social mobility in Europe and their close relation to massive structural shifts. The erosion 
of the education-occupation linkage presents a current threat to this trend. Considering formal 
credentials only, the most equalitarian educational systems are to be found in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland, but their ability to allocate individuals in the occupational structure is 
lower than in the other regions. Scandinavian systems show higher chances of social mobility 
through education, while Mediterranean systems present lower fluidity rates in both the 
background-education link (like Eastern European countries) and the education-occupation 
link (like the UK & Ireland). Gender and migration are identified as key factors to explain 
these differences. 
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Há razões para esperar que a educação promova a mobilidade social intergeracional. Porém, a 
competência dos sistemas educativos para alimentar ou, pelo contrário, limitar a  mobilidade 
social continua a ser motivo de controvérsia. Neste texto, analisam-se dados do European 
Social Survey relativos a 22 países com o intuito de aferir os padrões de mobilidade social na 
segunda metade do século XX. A variação entre cinco grupos regionais coesos merece 
particular atenção. Os resultados confirmam as taxas crescentes de mobilidade social na 
Europa e a sua relação estreita com transformações estruturais massivas. Uma ameaça actual a 
esta tendência é constituída pelo enfraquecimento da relação educação-ocupação. 
Considerando apenas qualificações formais, os sistemas educativos mais igualitários 
encontram-se no Reino Unido e na Irlanda, mas a sua capacidade para colocar indivíduos na 
estrutura ocupacional é menor do que noutras regiões. Os sistemas escandinavos apresentam 
probabilidades mais elevadas de mobilidade social através da educação, enquanto os sistemas 
mediterrânicos têm taxas menores de fluidez quer na relação origem-educação (como os 
países da Europa de Leste), quer na relação educação-ocupação (como o Reino Unido e a 
Irlanda). Género e migração são identificados como factores fundamentais para entender estas 
diferenças. 
 






Moving from a particular social class to another through individual merit is a feature often 
associated with modernity, democracy and industrialization. It is certainly utopic to think that 
equal opportunities would be accomplished as long as formal postulates were incorporated in 
national and international law-making, but one could expect modern societies to become 
progressively more “fluid”. 
A key pathway for modern times to enable social mobility is education. In fact, the extent 
to which educational systems may foster or otherwise constrain social mobility has been a 
controversial topic on the sociological agenda. The current paper makes a contribution to this 
debate by developing a number of theoretical statements and testing them on the European 




systems in Europe are still notably diverse. It is therefore possible to assess if some 
educational models are more efficient in stimulating social mobility while others are more 
“reproductive”, or else if educational models are irrelevant for social mobility patterns. 
Specific patterns regarding employment structure, gender and migration will be taken into 
account in this analysis of the complex relation between education and social mobility. 
 
 
SOCIAL MOBILITY AND EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS 
 
The dominant idea of functionalist sociology until the 1960s was expressed by Lipset and 
Bendix‟s (1959) classic comparative study which supported the thesis that industrialization 
fosters social mobility around the globe. While this notion inspired and legitimized a wide 
range of national and international policy-making, it has been criticized by many studies since 
the 70s. 
In the educational field, Coleman‟s (1975) report on the United States and the work of 
Bourdieu and Passeron (1964; 1970) in France earned a strong public impact. Both showed 
that educational achievement was attached to social background more than to any other factor; 
the chances of succeeding at school and graduating were considerably higher if the student‟s 
parents were, for example, highly educated professionals rather than illiterate factory workers. 
Some authors explained such variation by individual rational choices (Coleman, 1975; 
Boudon, 1974), whereas others argued that educational systems were appropriated by 
dominant classes as a tool for social reproduction and symbolic legitimacy (Bourdieu and 
Passeron, 1970; Bowles and Gintis, 1977). Later research by Devine (2004) or Fitz et al. 
(2006) in the United Kingdom broadly confirms such theses. While the “direct effect” of class 
background on class destination has declined, the “indirect effect” (through education) has 
actually increased since the 60s despite comprehensive educational policies. As concluded by 
Fitz et al. (2006: 75), “education has not served as a mechanism for increasing social 
mobility, rather it has become the means by which advantages have been transmitted 
intergenerationally”. 
Bertaux (1977) concluded that major moves between different social classes were 
generated by structural shifts rather than equality principles. According to his study, almost 
all peasants or factory workers had parents with the same occupation, but since the first group 
was shrinking a part of its members was moving into industry or low-skilled services. 




themselves drawing on their advantage in the educational system; since this class was 
expanding, the entrance of some new members was possible, especially children of service 
employees who did well at school. Thereby, schooling was at once enhancing mobility and 
reproducing privilege, as well as contributing to an overall shift from traditional class culture 
and solidarity to growing individualized values and mass culture (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 
2002). Such general patterns were observed from the 70s at least until the 90s (Merllié and 
Prévot, 1997). 
The influential book by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1993) compares different generations of 
people born between 1900 and 1950 in a handful of developed countries and observes a 
general stability (or a “constant flux”) of social fluidity patterns across time. In the words of 
the authors, “we have found no evidence of general and abiding trends towards higher levels 
either of total mobility or of social fluidity” (102). Social mobility appears to be fostered in 
the initial stages of the industrialization process since rural exodus generates a structural shift 
towards an enlargement of privileged classes, and it stagnates in the further stages of 
industrialization. 
Focusing on employment structure, Esping-Andersen et al. (1993) also attribute major 
shifts in the 20
th
 century to structural change rather than social fluidity based on equality 
principles. It should be underlined that the service sector grew dramatically between 1960 and 
1985 across industrialized countries. On the one hand, the number of professionals nearly 
doubled. The possibilities of young people from other social backgrounds to get into this 
group, in particular through education, increased. On the other hand, a “post-industrial 
proletariat” emerged with the expansion of low-skilled occupations in the service industry. 
Composed mostly by women, this group is especially vulnerable both to equality/democratic 
policy and exploitation/exclusion mechanisms, since it combines high rates of social mobility 
and high rates of de-protection and unemployment. Such group is smaller in “rigid systems” 
as Germany and larger in “open systems” as the United States. As stated by the authors, “the 
welfare state, the industrial relations system and education emerge as key institutional filters 
for employment structuration” (Esping-Andersen et al., 1993: 33). 
These various contributions succeeded in creating both theoretical arguments and statistical 
procedures that set a distinction between total measures of social mobility and relative or 
“circulation” rates. If structural change brings particular social classes to enlarge and others to 
contract, some social mobility is generated (for example, children of peasants become factory 
workers or technicians) but this is more properly considered a functional request, which 




that effective personal agency is located somewhere between total and relative mobility rates. 
It is true that the former is sustained by structural change, but people also participate in this 
change. Such participation may be considered at the individual level, for instance when 
someone holding a higher education diploma struggles to work as a professional and rejects 
other options, as much as at the collective level, for instance if individuals join a movement 
for the recognition of their activity as “skilled” or “professional” (Parkin, 1978). 
Using more sophisticated statistical procedures, recent works (such as Breen and Jonnson, 
2005; Breen et al., 2009) contribute to this controversy by showing that social fluidity has 
actually increased during the latest decades in some industrialized countries, especially in 
Central Europe and Scandinavia, while remaining stable in others (United States, Japan). The 
authors conclude that “several analyses have pointed out the importance of the educational 
system as the driving force behind changes in social fluidity and differences between 
countries” (Breen and Jonnson, 2005: 233). Buchanan and Hannun (2001) also claim that, if 
universal trends linked to the “industrialization thesis” may be refuted as clearly shown by 
evidence from Latin America or Africa, they may actually be a useful contribution to 
understand the evolution in specific regions of the world. For instance, in Southeast Asia 
social mobility trends increased during the industrialization process in close relation to state 
policy on education. In their comparison of some European countries, Muller and Karle 
(1993) highlight not only important differences between national educational systems – for 
instance, more selective and “reproductive” systems in Germany and France, more fluid and 
equalitarian systems in Scandinavia – but also their autonomy vis-a-vis the industrialization 
process. The authors concluded that an institutional approach should be privileged in order to 
understand these differences (see also Andersen and Van de Werfhorst, 2010). 
Extensive international benchmarks such as the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (OECD, 2001, 2004, 2007) suggest that social background, despite being an 
important factor to explain inequalities in academic achievement worldwide, is more crucial 
in some countries than others, and this variation is not correlated with economic patterns, nor 
with average scores. Van de Werfhorst and Mijs (2010) explore this variation drawing on two 
major differences in educational systems: internal differentiation and national standardization. 
According to their study, systems with apparent early differentiation (based on tracking) 
and/or large private sectors produce a stronger relation between social background and 
educational achievement, with visible effects on efficiency (higher average scores) and 
greater social reproduction. Standardization (for example, through prescriptive curricula and 




Considerations on gender and migration have increasingly come to the fore, although they 
remain to a large extent marginal in the quantitative analysis of social mobility. Links 
between the growing number of women in paid employment and the worldwide expansion of 
education, the enlargement of the service industry, or job mobility and corporate flexibility 
strategies have been documented (Hochschild, 1989, 2000; Esping-Andersen et al., 1993; 
Schofer and Meyer, 2005; Soskice, 2005; Boca and Wetzels, 2008; Bastos et al., 2009). In 
addition, the fast increase in the number of university graduates raised concerns about the 
“over-education” of workers and the particular vulnerability of women to a downgrade in skill 
and status ladders as “latecomers” in the labor market (Thurow, 1999; McIntosh, 2005; De 
Grip, 2005). A report published by the European Commission (2009a) suggests that the 
impact of gender on occupational segregation has persisted if not increased over time. 
However, the use of quantitative methodology on this subject remains sparse due to either 
research tradition or lack of reliable data (Oakley, 2000). 
At the same time, the share of foreign workers in western societies is now larger than ever 
recorded (Castles and Miller, 2003). OECD‟s (2008) extensive report on the profile of 
migrants uncovers two distinct trends during the period of 1985-2005 in Europe: in the 
northern half of the continent (except for Ireland), immigrant populations became much 
higher educated, whereas in the southern half this was not the case at all; indeed, the reverse 
trend is observed in Italy, Greece and Spain. The same report also shows that over-
qualification is more common for migrants than indigenous in all countries, three or four 
times as much in some cases. This is especially the case in Southern European and 
Scandinavian countries. A growing body of research exposes important effects of institutional 
arrangements on immigrants‟ rate of unemployment (Zorlu, 2008; Reyneri and Fullin, 2011; 
Lagana, 2011), longevity of employment contract (Kogan, 2011), wages (Zorlu and Hartog, 
2005), or investments in education (Van Tubergen and Van de Werfhorst, 2007). In 
particular, Reyneri and Fullin (2010: 46-7) compare research in six coutries of Europe and 
conclude that while “penalization as regards access to more qualified occupations still occurs 
in all countries, for all migrant groups and for both genders”, the returns on education seem to 
vary across countries and generations of migrants. The suggestion of these authors is that 
difference is closely related to risks of unemployment and level of welfare assistance 
available. 
The analysis of data from the European Social Survey 2008 will allow us to examine three 




observed over the last decades in Europe? Second, what is the impact of different educational 
systems on such trends? Last, can gender and migration explain some of this variation? 
 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
Sophistication in the analysis of social mobility increased considerably over time, but some 
challenges persist. To start with, advances in data collection have hardly followed or been 
followed by theoretical statements. This means today there is a significant explaining deficit 
and little ability to inform public debate or policy-making. Such lack of explanation is related 
to “abstracted” notions of social and educational mobility, eluding central markers such as 
social class or educational level. Dealing with these variables as continuous variables enables 
some statistical operations, although it may reduce their sociological relevance. This is why 
the classic studies of Bertaux (1978) or Bourdieu and Passeron (1964; 1970) are critically 
recovered in this paper, favouring a double qualitative bond in such relation. In other words, 
to be a factory worker or a business man, as well as a higher education graduate or an early 
school-leaver, can not be reduced to different points on a scale (or two scales) since these 
identity markers hold specific (qualitative) social and cultural meanings.
1
 
On the other hand, as claimed by Buchanan and Hannun (2001), most comparisons have 
covered only Northern-Western developed countries. It is important to question if similar 
trends can be found in other regions of the world such as Latin America, Africa, Asia, or even 
Southern and Eastern Europe. Certainly a major downfall is the lack of reliable and 
comparable data for some regions.   
Breen and Jonnson (2005) acknowledge that recent extensive data collection platforms 
such as the European Social Survey (ESS) enable large-scale comparative analysis as 
questions are designed to be comparable and applied across different countries. Funded by the 
European Union, the ESS is led by the City University‟s Centre for Comparative Social 
Surveys in the United Kingdom and developed in cooperation with six other research units in 
Europe. In its most recent version (4
th
 Edition, 2008/2009), the EES covered a sample of 
56,752 individuals, representing all people aged 16 and over in 31 European countries. The 
questionnaire includes 662 variables and it has been improved since the 1
st
 Edition in 2002. 
                                               
1 A radical perspective might avoid any cross-national quantitative comparison, but we argue that it is possible to 
develop a comparative study that is more sensitive to the cultural meanings of class and education if these 




One of the limitations is that national sample sizes are small in comparison with datasets 
used in other studies (e. g. Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993; Breen and Jonnson, 2005). Our 
analysis will deal with this problem by zooming out the units, that is, comparing not countries 
but regions within Europe. Such procedure is possible because there are theoretical arguments 
and empirical evidence on common trends within European regions regarding social class 




Five regional clusters will be considered in our analysis (Table 1). A similar typology is 
famously used by Esping-Andersen (1993) in characterizing welfare regimes in Central and 
Northern Europe. His contribution has been discussed by a wide range of authors since then, 
in particular due to its neglecting or misplacement of gender issues (Trifiletti, 1999). The 
expansion of the original typology to embrace the notion of specific types of welfare regimes 
both in Mediterranean countries (Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Gal, 2010) and Central-Eastern 
countries (Cerami, 2006; Fenger, 2007) has also been put forward. On the other hand, 
Archer‟s (1978) socio-historical study of European educational systems provides an important 
theoretical basis for our typology in that it provides an in-depth analysis of one system in each 
of our clusters except for Mediterranean countries. Some recent comparisons were also useful 
to sketch ongoing trends and challenges in different national educational systems across 
Europe (Prats and Raventos, 2005). 
 























Scandinavian +++ +++ +++ +++ ++ +++ +++ 
Central ++ ++ +++ ++ +++ ++ ++ 
Mediterranean ++ + + + + + + 
UK & Ireland ++ ++ ++ +++ + +++ ++ 
Eastern + ++ +++ + ++ + ++ 
Note: Regional profiles are based on OECD (2009, 2010) and Martins (2010). 
 
The Scandinavian cluster comprises Finland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway. It is 
characterized by a long-term high state budget for education, low-differentiated 
comprehensive secondary systems (with residual levels of retention and drop-out), high rates 
                                               
2 In doing so, risks naturally arise; some generalizations are requested and some variability is lost, but an holistic 
approach to social and educational systems is respected. The alternative option of isolating particular variables 




of higher education attendance and lifelong learning, high scores in international skill tests, 
technologically advanced schools, and decentralized organization relying largely on the 
autonomy of municipalities and schools. Most of these features were established before the 
60s and they are associated with an equalitarian advanced social structure, professionals 
making up nearly 30% of the adult population. 
Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Austria make up the Central 
cluster. Their systems combine average public investment (in % of GDP) and average private 
investment, a high ratio of students to teaching staff, expanded vocational pathways at 
secondary education level, low higher education attendance and average scores in 
international tests. Educational systems are greatly stratified under the influence of protective 
and corporate employment systems and welfare regimes. Such “rigid” systems are associated 
with a specific social structure in which the share of “post-industrial proletariat” (service 
employees) is small, but their possibilities of social mobility are also little. Likewise, tertiary 
education rates are not high but those who do complete tertiary education are expected to 
attain a secure place in the professional class. 
Composed of Portugal, Spain and Greece, the Mediterranean cluster presents low rates of 
higher education attendance, low results in international tests, a recent public investment in 
education (partially supported by the European Union) and low private investment, a selective 
though undifferentiated secondary education model with high levels of retention and drop-out, 
and a national centralized structure. The share of youth out of both education and paid 
employment is relatively high. Although these countries went through significant structural 
changes during the past decades, such patterns are apparent when comparing them with the 
other European countries, and they are still ascribed a more traditional social structure and a 
smaller “new middle-class”. 
The UK & Ireland cluster shows average public investment and high private investment, 
especially in tertiary education. Organization is based on a comprehensive, liberal and 
decentralized structure. This system enhances variation in scores of students and schools; not 
unrelated, rates of higher education attendance and lifelong learning are high, while early 
drop-out rates in secondary education are also substantial. Such patterns are linked to an open 
and flexible social structure, with high levels of inequality and weaker employment relations. 
The transition from education to work is therefore risky, and a high percentage of higher 
education graduates cannot get professional jobs. 
Countries of the Eastern cluster are characterized by a specific “post-communist” system 




segments, average scores in international tests and average rates of higher education 
attendance. Recently grown professional classes incorporate a high percentage of higher 
education graduates. Our analysis will consider Central-Eastern countries only (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia), since countries from 
South-Eastern Europe hold other specific patterns. 
As for social class, the ISCO classification used in the ESS will be aggregated in five main 
classes: (A) legislators, officials and managers, characterized by property and/or top 
organizational authority; (B) professionals and technicians, characterized by advanced 
specialized skills; (C) clerks and service workers, comprising mainly interpersonal 
occupations; (D) skilled agricultural workers, craft workers and industrial operators; and (E) 
street vendors, cleaners and rural laborers. The singularity of service workers (the “post-
industrial proletariat” according to Esping-Andersen et al., 1993) is thus respected, since their 
daily work, required skills, working conditions and mobility opportunities are considerably 
different than both professionals and industrial or agricultural workers. The aggregation of 
agricultural workers with other groups requires some caution, but since this group is small in 
contemporary Europe (especially in some regions) it generates non-representative samples 
when considered separately. 
Comparing the educational degree and occupation of the active population with those of 
their fathers when respondents were 14 years old will be used as an indicator of 
intergenerational social mobility. Based on the literature review, estimates of total mobility 
(the number of people who joined a class other than recorded for their father) must be then 
followed by estimates of relative mobility, i. e. the same value weighted against the change in 
dimension of occupational categories over the period at stake. A limitation of this 
methodology is that the occupation of both ESS respondents and their fathers is recorded at 
different ages, and it is likely that individuals progress in the labor market over their lifetime. 
Students working in service occupations, for example, may be recorded as experiencing 
(temporary) downward mobility but will often get higher status occupations later on. 
Estimates may thus contain some negative distortion, affecting especially Scandinavian 
countries as they hold the highest rates of working students (European Commission, 2009b). 
However, this is not too problematic since five aggregate occupational categories are used and 
a low rate of individual mobility between them is expected. Plus, social mobility through 
formal careers within organizations is declining (Van Leeuwen & Maas, 2010). Numbers 
confirm that the proportion of people in the two categories with the highest status is similar in 




accessing them. Except in the Scandinavian cluster, class A is actually larger in the younger 
generations than in the older ones; in Mediterranean countries, such proportion reaches as 
high as 3 to 1. Finally, it is difficult to account for the lifetime effect because future itself is 
uncertain. For instance, an economic crisis may block expected upward mobility. 
Analysis will consider all active population born from 1940 to 1984. In order to assess 
change over time, the 1970-84 cohort will sometimes be treated separately. Specific trends 
regarding those who went through education since 1975 and entered the labour market in the 






Social mobility across Europe 
 
ESS data on workers‟ and their fathers‟ occupations show that total rates of upward social 
mobility in Europe in the period of 1955-2008 were very high, while downward mobility was 
low: 59.2% of the total active population belong to a class higher than their father‟s, and 
10.2% experienced extreme upward mobility (from D to A or from E to A/B); only 14.1% 
hold a class position lower than their father‟s, and reproduction rate is 26.7%. The correlation 
in intergenerational social class is therefore relevant but weak (0.286). 
The 1970-1984 cohort shows a slight increase both in downward mobility (15.4%) and 
reproduction rate (27.6%). It is however important to remember that a substantial number of 
these workers are in the very early stage of their career (around 80% of them are younger than 
their father was when they were 14), so prospects of moving into a different class in the future 
are still considerable. 
Reproduction rates are the highest in the Mediterranean and Eastern clusters, while nearing 
25% in the remaining three clusters (Table 2). This difference appears to be associated mainly 
with lower levels of downward mobility in the former. Upward mobility rates are about 60% 
in all five regions, extreme mobility being greater in Scandinavia. Considering the 70-84 
cohort only, reproduction rates are the highest in Eastern Europe and the lowest in UK & 
Ireland. However, downward mobility is higher in Scandinavia and UK & Ireland, while 





Table 2. Total mobility rate and relative mobility index 
 Active population 1970-84 cohort 





Relative mobility index 
Scandinavian 75.4% 1.04 72.0% 1.06 
Central 75.0% 1.07 72.4% 1.10 
Mediterranean 72.2% 1.16 72.3% 1.04 
UK & Ireland 75.8% 1.07 74.8% 1.11 
Eastern 69.8% 0.95 68.0% 0.90 
Note: Total mobility rate = % of population that holds a social class position different than their father‟s (when 
they were 14). Relative mobility index = total population in a class different than their father‟s / sum of 
differences in occupational structure from one generation to another. According to this index, a value higher than 
1 means a social mobility flux that is greater than structural shift. 
 
Two major fluxes in Europe can be discerned. Most descendants of class A moved to a 
growing class B; and most descendants from eroding class E moved to class D.
3
 Other fluxes 
vary between regions according to structural shifts. In Central Europe and Scandinavia, a 
move from classes C or D to class B is common. In the Mediterranean countries, class C has 
been more reproductive and it also “absorbed” many individuals from class D. UK & Ireland 
show an intermediate pattern with higher mobility only between “neighbor” classes, in 
particular from classes C to B, and D to C. Finally, in the Eastern cluster many children of 
workers in class C entered class B, while class D appears to be more reproductive.     
A comparison between the occupations of the active population and their fathers‟ uncovers 
a huge increase of classes A and B (except for class A in Scandinavia), while classes D and E 
decreased all over Europe. Curiously, class C experienced a huge increase in UK & Ireland 
and Eastern Europe, a moderate increase in the Mediterranean and Scandinavian clusters, and 
a slight decrease in the Central one. Structural change in the Mediterranean cluster was 
smaller than in the other regions if the whole active population is considered, but it was 
especially high considering only the population born in 1970-84 surpassing all other regions 
except Eastern Europe. Such evidence confirms that the structural shift often associated with 
modernity occurred earlier in Central Europe, Great Britain and Scandinavia, apparently 
slowing down after the 70s crisis, while in the Mediterranean countries it took place in the 
final quarter of the twentieth century. Data from the Eastern cluster are more complex, 
                                               
3 In regards to class A, it should be noted that property may be transmitted only to some of the descendants or in 
a later stage of life when parents retire or die. Moreover, it is a mistake to conceive this class as the “elite”. 
Members of the elite are surely comprised in this class, but so are small businessmen, some of whom live in 





suggesting a double structural shift led by industrialization (60s and 70s) and the transition to 
capitalism (90s). 
Taking this into account, relative social mobility appears to be slightly higher in the 
Mediterranean cluster, and lower in the Eastern one. However, considering the 1970-84 
cohort only, social mobility increased moderately in the other three regions while decaying in 
Mediterranean countries and Eastern Europe, now clearly the less fluid cluster in our 
comparison. 
A detailed analysis of each social class (Table 3) shows that reproduction patterns are 
higher in classes A, B and E, while class C is the most fluid. However, there are differences 
across regions. Class B is especially reproductive in Mediterranean countries, the same 
happening with class A in Eastern and class E in Central.  
 
Table 3. Relative reproduction index by social class and region 
 A B C D E 
Scandinavian 1.69 (1.44) 1.55 (1.35) 1.04 (1.19) 1.19 (1.33) 1.59 (1.08) 
Central 1.67 (2.10) 1.57 (1.49) 1.01 (0.94) 1.26 (1.47) 1.83 (2.00) 
Mediterranean 1.67 (1.97) 2.72 (2.31) 1.19 (1.08) 1.08 (1.20) 1.42 (1.46) 
UK & Ireland 1.65 (1.54) 1.63 (1.46) 1.03 (1.03) 1.12 (1.20) 1.25 (1.43) 
Eastern 2.33 (2.42) 2.14 (1.93) 1.08 (1.09) 1.08 (1.17) 1.82 (2.02) 
Note: Relative reproduction index = (current members of the class whose father was also in this class / n of this 
class in their fathers‟ generation) / (current n of this class / total n). In parenthesis, the same data is provided only 
for the active population born in 1970-1984. In this index, 1 would be a totally equalitarian class without 
reproduction mechanisms. 
 
In what comes to the 1970-84 cohort, fluidity in the extremes (classes A and E) is the 
highest in Scandinavia, and the lowest in Central, Eastern and Mediterranean countries. In the 
UK and Ireland, classes A and B are more fluid, while D and E turn out to be slightly more 
reproductive. Two different interpretations are possible at this point: fluidity has actually 
increased since the 80s in Scandinavia while it decreased in Central and Mediterranean 
Europe; and/or career (lifelong) mobility is higher in the former cluster and lower in the latter. 








The impact of educational systems 
 
Assessing to what extent educational systems foster social mobility requests a double-bind 
analysis: education should have an impact on the allocation of individuals in the employment 
structure; and education should allow similar opportunities to members of all classes. 
Considering aggregate numbers, the share of population who is in the expected class 
according to their education is considerably high (64.5%).
4
 A higher education credential is 
particularly important to join the classes at the top level of status: 51.4% in class A and 62.3% 
in class B completed tertiary education. Such rate rises to 58.6% and 71.5% in the 1970-84 
cohort, but since educational levels increased faster this correlation has slightly decreased (see 
Table 4). Regarding the other classes, education is more heterogeneous. Particularly in the 
1970-84 cohort, access to class C (83.6%) and D (73.2%) became strongly dependent on 
holding an upper secondary diploma. Hence, despite the small size of class E (8.15%) this is 
where most of the early school leavers are now concentrated (51.3%). 
 










Less than lower 
sec / class E 
Correlation 
educ/class 
Scandinavian 1.53 (1.25) 1.69 (1.66) 1.41 (1.49) 1.45 (1.68) 2.95 (5.24) 0.675 
Central 1.58 (1.55) 1.74 (1.67) 1.35 (1.39) 1.37 (1.48) 4.31 (5.86) 0.661 
Mediterranean 1.26 (1.20) 3.22 (2.43) 1.48 (1.30) 0.74  (0.98) 1.81 (2.25) 0.506 
UK & Ireland 1.31 (1.24) 1.61 (1.45) 1.38 (1.41) 1.11 (1.61) 2.60 (3.79) 0.574 
Eastern 2.55 (2.07) 2.33 (2.14) 1.24 (1.21) 1.15 (1.26) 4.82 (5.61) 0.790 
Note: Index = (n with education y in class z / n in class z) / (n with education y / total n). So, 1 would be that 
education y is irrelevant to achieving class z. In parenthesis, the results for the 1970-1984 offspring are 
presented. 
 
Variation across regions is considerable, and a link with governance frames (more than 
economic structure) can be established. The Eastern cluster shows a much stronger correlation 
between educational level and occupational position, especially in classes C and D, reflecting 
the central role of education in allocating individuals in the former communist system.
5
 
Scandinavia and Central Europe also present a strong correlation in this respect, confirming 
the influence of socio-democratic systems with highly regulated, corporative and protective 
                                               
4 Expected education is higher education completed for class A and B, at least upper secondary for class C, at 
least lower secondary for class D, and less than lower secondary for class E. 
5 It is important to stress that a large number of workers in 2008 entered paid employment before the transition to 




employment systems (particularly visible in class D). In contrast, the UK & Ireland cluster 
exhibits a much more liberal pattern, with a lower association between educational credentials 
and occupational distribution except for the concentration of early school leavers in class E. 
In the Mediterranean cluster, tertiary education appears to be quite important to access class B 
but a secondary degree is not so relevant to enter classes C or D, which pulls down the 
correlation between education and class. 
In the 1970-84 cohort, contrasting patterns are apparent. While access to higher classes for 
those with tertiary education became increasingly harder in Mediterranean countries (28.6% 
of them are now clerks or service workers), such access became actually easier in the Central, 
Eastern and Scandinavian clusters, and it remained stable in the UK & Ireland one. 
Meanwhile, the correlation between holding a secondary degree and entering classes C or D 
grew all over Europe. 
The impact of social background on educational attainment is higher in tertiary than in 
upper secondary education, but such impact decreased in both (Table 5). Thus, the 
educational advantage of growing up in a privileged milieu or the handicap of those who did 
not are smaller in the younger generation, but curiously the same development is not observed 
for the children of workers in class D. 
Social background is particularly crucial for academic achievement in the Mediterranean 
and Eastern clusters (in the latter, only for tertiary education). In these countries, having a 
father in class A seems to be an advantage even in comparison with those having a father in 
class B, suggesting a higher concentration of resources in class A and/or an easier conversion 
of such resources into educational advantage, in contrast to a slight advantage of class B 
descendants in the other regions. Meanwhile, social class became almost irrelevant to 
complete upper secondary education in Scandinavia and Central Europe, as well as tertiary 
education in the UK and Ireland. Unfortunately, this impressive progress in the islands is 
undermined by a lower correlation between education and destination class, and possibly a 
higher impact of different “schooling circuits” (horizontal differentiation).
6






                                               
6 This latest thesis is based on influent studies (e. g. Gewirtz, Bowe and Ball, 1995) and unfortunately it can not 




Table 5. Impact of social background in opportunities of completing tertiary and upper secondary education 
Clusters Degree 
Social Background 
A B C D E 
Scandinavian 
Tertiary 1.66 (1.39) 1.69 (1.41) 1.14 (1.03) 0.83 (0.81) 0.62 (0.74) 
UpperSec 1.17 (1.06) 1.15 (1.06) 1.07 (1.01) 0.99 (0.98) 0.84 (0.93) 
Central 
Tertiary 1.78 (1.58) 1.85 (1.70) 1.24 (1.16) 0.74 (0.68) 0.50 (0.61) 
UpperSec 1.14 (1.07) 1.18 (1.12) 1.06 (1.03) 0.99 (0.99) 0.79 (0.82) 
Mediterranean 
Tertiary 3.00 (2.41) 2.92 (2.17) 1.64 (1.41) 0.86 (0.81) 0.48 (0.58) 
UpperSec 1.76 (1.43) 1.83 (1.36) 1.39 (1.21) 1.01 (0.93) 0.65 (0.82) 
UK & Ireland 
Tertiary 1.40 (1.11) 1.50 (1.24) 1.13 (1.04) 0.91 (0.93) 0.74 (0.89) 
UpperSec 1.36 (1.17) 1.29 (1.11) 1.13 (1.06) 0.93 (0.95) 0.82 (0.90) 
Eastern 
Tertiary 2.75 (2.28) 2.74 (2.24) 1.61 (1.39) 0.84 (0.78) 0.50 (0.57) 
UpperSec 1.17 (1.09) 1.17 (1.10) 1.13 (1.09) 1.06 (1.01) 0.82 (0.83) 
Note: Index = (n of certified from each social background / n of social background) / (n of certified / total n). In 
parenthesis, the results for the 1970-1984 offspring are presented. As in the previous table, 1 would be no impact 
of social class in educational assets. 
 
Educational systems are a relevant factor in explaining lower class fluidity in 
Mediterranean and Eastern countries. In the UK and Ireland, social background is almost 
irrelevant for educational achievement but the influence of education in allocating individuals 
in the occupational structure is also lower. Progress in the Scandinavian and Central clusters 
appears to be more sustained: the impact of social background on educational achievement 
declined while the importance of academic degrees for occupational allocation remained high. 
 
 
Gender and migration 
 
In all five regions, the 1970-84 cohort confirms a considerable increase in women‟s 
educational attainment and participation in paid employment.
7
 Despite noticeable steps 
towards equality, the gender division of labor seems to have remained quite stable. Women 
are concentrated in classes B and C, while men are predominant in classes A and D, and such 
tendency appears to increase in the 1970-84 cohort except for class A. Only in class E is there 
a consistent trend towards gender distribution. This pattern is apparent in all regions, though 
                                               
7 Such phenomenon was especially pervasive during the 60s and 70s in the Scandinavian, Central, Eastern and 
UK & Ireland clusters, and during the 80s and 90s in the Mediterranean one. Interestingly, the ESS data also 
suggest that in the last twenty years such trend has been almost absent in the UK & Ireland cluster and it is 




less significant among the older generation in the Eastern cluster and the younger generation 
in UK & Ireland. 
The concentration of women in intermediary classes contrasts with their current pattern of 
educational dispersion. Since the generation born in the 60s, the number of women in tertiary 
education surpassed men‟s, especially in Scandinavia; but they have also remained over-
represented among early school leavers, especially in Mediterranean countries. It is important 
to stress that intergenerational reproduction appears to be higher for men, while women 
register more often upward mobility. However, this can not be attributed solely to women‟s 
educational attainment, but also to a general admittance of the daughters of factory workers 
into service occupations. 
The impact of gender on the relation between education and class is not linear, but two 
overall patterns can be identified. First, the correlation between early school drop-out and 
holding a job in class E is much stronger for women. Second, the correlation between 
completing upper secondary education and holding a job in class D is only observed for men 
(see Table 6). This is a powerful reason for the current predominance of women in higher 
education and their lower enrolment in vocational tracks. Surprisingly, the impact of 
education on accessing dominant classes is higher for women only in Scandinavia, and it is 
actually lower in Eastern and Central Europe. 
 










Less than lower 
sec / class E 
Scandinavian 1.27 1.25 0.92 0.80 2.24 
Central 0.90 0.89 1.02 0.79 1.77 
Mediterranean 0.78 1.25 1.10 0.38 1.34 
UK & Ireland 1.02 1.01 0.72 0.59 1.46 
Eastern 0.91 0.97 1.08 0.84 1.10 
Note: the same formula of table 4 was used. 1 would be no impact of gender on education-occupation linkage. 
More than 1 means that such linkage is higher for women, and less than 1 the opposite. 
 
The impact of gender on the correlation between social background and education is also 
far from uniform, with variations across both classes and regions (Table 7). For instance, 
women whose father worked in class E are the ones with the fewest chances of attending 
tertiary education in the Mediterranean and Eastern clusters; in the Scandinavian and UK & 
Ireland clusters, boys whose father worked in this class experienced more educational 




education more often than boys, probably because the latter are more attracted to follow their 
fathers‟ occupation (and there are more rewards to do so), but the opposite pattern is observed 
in the Central cluster. 
Having a father in classes A or B is an important factor of educational achievement 
especially for boys in the Scandinavian, UK & Ireland and Eastern clusters. Since the 
advantage of women in education is stronger and many girls from unprivileged classes attend 
tertiary education, being raised in class A or B turns out to be a more important safeguard for 
boys. But in the Central and Mediterranean clusters, class B presents similar advantages for 
both sexes, and belonging to class A actually appears as a major factor of educational success 
for girls. Explanation may include an enduring strategy in class A to transfer property and/or 
authority to male descendants and compensate girls with higher educational opportunities in 
order to access class B.  
 
Table 7. Impact of gender on social background-education linkage 
Clusters Degree 
Social Background 
A B C D E 
Scandinavian 
Tertiary 0.87 0.91 0.85 1.05 1.34 
UpperSec 0.99 0.96 0.97 1.00 1.04 
Central 
Tertiary 1.17 1.01 1.05 0.91 1.02 
UpperSec 1.06 1.03 1.04 0.97 0.96 
Mediterranean 
Tertiary 1.23 1.01 1.01 1.17 0.89 
UpperSec 1.04 1.05 1.04 1.00 1.02 
UK & Ireland 
Tertiary 0.82 0.90 1.07 0.94 1.25 
UpperSec 1.03 0.94 1.00 0.91 1.21 
Eastern 
Tertiary 0.89 0.92 0.90 1.19 0.95 
UpperSec 0.98 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.01 
Note: the formula in use is similar to tables 4 and 6. 1 means no gender impact on background-education linkage. 
More than one means that such linkage is stronger for women.   
 
If downward mobility was not a common experience during the last decades in Europe, 
immigrants have twice the chances of going through it than natives. Access to class B appears 
to be especially difficult for immigrants, whereas the possibilities of entering class E are 
considerably higher. Difference between migrants and natives is much greater in the 
Mediterranean cluster than in the Eastern or UK & Ireland ones. 
Understanding variation across regions requires the number and profile of migrants to be 
taken into account. The share of immigrant workers is substantially higher in Central Europe 




Mediterranean countries have a secondary education credential, while they are highly 
educated in Scandinavia and UK & Ireland. In both Eastern and Central Europe, immigrants‟ 
background and educational profiles are more diversified: either low or highly qualified 
(Table 8).  
Regardless of their background and educational degree, there is a major concentration of 
immigrants in class E in the Scandinavian, Central and Mediterranean clusters. In the UK & 
Ireland cluster, concentration is lower but still significant considering that migrants hold a 
higher educational profile. Importantly, the concentration of immigrant workers in class E 
regardless of educational level is correlated to relative upward social mobility among natives, 
particularly in small movements: from class E to D, D to C, C to B and B to A. This is 
especially the case in Central Europe and UK & Ireland, considering the greater share of 
immigrant workers, as well as in Mediterranean countries. 
 
Table 8. Impact of immigration in education and social class by region 
 Education Social Class 
 L LS US T A B C D E 
Scandinavian 0.33 1.05 0.87 1.18 0.61 0.88 1.13 0.90 1.93 
Central  1.60 1.13 0.81 1.05 0.99 0.82 0.81 0.83 1.98 
UK & Ireland 0.52 0.45 1.29 1.40 0.68 1.06 0.97 1.02 1.17 
Mediterranean 0.55 1.32 1.56 0.94 0.99 0.38 0.90 0.83 2.36 
Central East 2.11 0.99 0.88 1.36 0.74 0.69 1.11 1.20 1.11 
Note: the index was calculated as the proportion of immigrants in each category, considering the total of 
immigrants in each region. 1 would be a social distribution of immigrants similar to native population. Less than 






The ESS data provides evidence to support the thesis that modernity allows a high degree of 
social mobility, especially due to massive structural shifts. In its early stages, it also generates 
high rates of relative mobility. This is likely to be related to more than just the dimension of 
different occupational classes. The shift from traditional rural societies to modern urban ones 
produces changes in the very nature of occupations, thus enhancing higher relative social 
mobility. Social mobility appears to be the lowest in the Eastern cluster. This pattern is 




increased among those who were born in the 1970-84 period and entered the labor market 
mainly since the 90s. 
As pointed out in recent contributions (Breen and Jonnson, 2005; Breen et al., 2009), 
education appears to have a positive effect on social mobility. Based on our analysis, the 
overall impact of social background on educational attainment has decreased across Europe 
challenging reproduction theorists, although Mediterranean and Eastern European educational 
systems remain more “reproductive” than the others. Thus, if internal differentiation and 
national standardization are important factors to understand systems openness (Van de 
Werfhorst and Mijs, 2010), our analysis suggests that other aspects shall be considered such 
as the investment in education, the degree of local decisions and the dominant culture within 
educational systems. For instance, although formal differentiation is not high in 
Mediterranean and British educational systems, there are pervasive patterns of horizontal 
informal differentiation (between schools and sometimes between groups within the same 
school). The impact of such feature is not possible to adress with ESS dataset, but it is 
probably an important constraint to social mobility through education.  
Meanwhile, a major threat to the enhancement of social mobility is comprised within the 
erosion of the education-occupation linkage. As educational systems expanded faster than 
classes A and B over the last three decades, correlation between dominant classes and tertiary 
education has slightly decreased among the younger generation. One may still wonder 
whether a number of these workers will move to a different class in a later moment in life, 
also depending on coming economic and political developments. 
Major differences across regions have been uncovered. They seem to be unrelated to 
development stages, confirming the “institutional thesis” (Muller and Karle, 1993). 
Considering only formal credentials, the most equalitarian educational systems are to be 
found in the UK & Ireland cluster, but their ability to allocate individuals into the 
occupational structure is lower than in the other regions. A higher inequality in prestige of 
educational institutions may be part of the explanation. Mingling both indicators, 
Scandinavian systems generate higher chances of social mobility through education, while 
Mediterranean systems present lower fluidity rates in both the background-education link 
(like Eastern countries) and the education-occupation link (like the UK and Ireland). 
The coexistence of high rates of relative social mobility and reproductive educational 
systems in the Mediterranean cluster warrants closer examination. Two issues should be 
addressed. On one hand, the expansion of the educational system happened faster than in the 




unprivileged groups in spite of its reproductive character. On the other hand, relative mobility 
rates were also induced by the aforementioned shift in the „nature‟ of classes, a process that is 
only partially linked to educational systems. Such process affected especially those who 
entered the labor market between the 60s and the 80s. The recent political mobilization of 
youth in these countries is probably an expression of resentment against the reduction of 
social mobility opportunities. 
Despite the impact of educational democratization, our analysis confirms that gender and 
migration are important in the characterization of the mobility patterns under study. The 
massive entrance of women in paid employment fostered social mobility as newcomers fitted 
into expanding classes B and C, while access to classes A and D remained relatively restricted 
in all regions. Education was key in this transformation, enabling the access of women to 
class B through university degrees. Yet, educational credentials held by women have a lower 
value in accessing other classes. In particular, access to class C calls on the examination of 
symbolic constructions of skill and gender in the distribution of labor (Hochschild, 2000; 
Payne, 2009). Moreover, the employment of daughters of industrial and agricultural workers 
in service jobs is a controversial kind of upward mobility. Some of these jobs certainly mean 
gains in status, personal health and career expectations, but a different picture may arise 
concerning wages, unionism and solidarity, or employment stability (Esping-Andersen et al., 
1993). 
On the other hand, evidence corroborates and expands Reyneri and Fullin‟s (2010, 2011) 
observation on the penalization of migrants in accessing more qualified occupations. For one, 
the impact of education on the employment trajectory of migrants varies across the five 
regional clusters under examination. At the same time, there is an overall correlat ion between 
the concentration of immigrant workers in class E and relative upward social mobility among 
natives, although this correlation is stronger in some regions than in others. The lower social 
mobility observed in Eastern countries should not be disentangled from the lesser impact of 





Our findings confirm that structural change should not be excluded from the analysis of social 
mobility, especially concerning the formation, „nature‟ and dimension of each social class. By 




also difference across regions and time. Likewise, this paper corroborates the relevance of an 
institutional approach especially sensitive to difference in educational systems (Buchanan and 
Hannun, 2001; Breen and Jonnson, 2005; Andersen and Van de Werfhorst, 2010). 
Some recommendations to public policies around Europe may be sketched from our 
findings. The systems for the recognition of immigrants‟ educational credentials shall be 
improved in many countries, in order to sustain equal opportunities and to boost economic 
productivity. Also, a better gender balance shall be granted in upper secondary (specially 
vocational) pathways, in order to enhance abilities and labor opportunities of girls who are not 
following to tertiary education. Educational (and employment) systems shall also reinforce 
their strategies to enable the access of women to class A and of men to class C, since both 
cases appear to rely specially on gender differentiation developed on primary socialization. 
Besides, some policies shall be developed in Meditteranean and Eastern clusters, in order to 
erode the „reproductive‟ role of educational systems. Strong structural changes during the 70s 
and 80s may have generated a semblance of equality that current times are proving to be 
elusive, raising deception among youth. Meanwhile, especially in UK & Ireland, the erosion 
of education-occupation linkage should be tackled by public policies committed with both 
equality and development principles.   
Two issues should be addressed in future research. One of them is that while features of 
employment and economic structure are certainly crucial to social mobility, the role of 
governance frames and welfare models deserves closer examination. Second, the ability of 
particular educational systems in allocating individuals in the occupational structure is far 
from uniform. Differences based on gender and ethnic origin are to be considered, and 
research design must certainly cover more detailed information in these regards. In addition, it 
should not be forgotten that individual mobility over the lifetime must be accounted for in 
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